Vices of consent to the granting of an agreement

"II .- The arguments on which bases its appeal Mrs. MCR can be classified into two groups: one side claims that its depressed state, led by the problems that led to the coexistence with Mr. PJS, took her to sign an agreement that granted in the custody of his son without the father of the child she had delivered a conscious and free consent, and another argued that the psychological disorder that the was affected by mild and you were not supposed to care for their disabled child adequately. In order to answer the arguments of the appellant should be emphasized that the decision to appeal the sentence was entirely proper at the time what was issued and that is to be reviewed at this height. Whether or not the correct diagnosis is reached, two psychiatric reports highlighted that Mrs. MCR was not at that time able to take care of a child who was then a year and a half, given the psychological disorders suffered by, without at any time prominence they prevented him lucidly grasp the consequences that could involve accepting the fact that the custody of the child is attributed to his father.
The distinction between the consequences that may entail a certain psychological state in relation to another case and is clear. The ability to act is presumed and people counted only in severe cases can be considered a psychological disorder that prevents a person to discern the consequences of their actions and implies that this lack of discernment is maintained over a long period of time, this case the four months that elapsed since the signing of the agreement until the filing of the demand. However, this idea that the state can not have affected him to the custody of a child a year and a half old until it has passed its situation.
III .- On the other hand, if the perceptions of two professionals that are contained in the reports provided were incorrect and the demand, as the report signed by Mr. MGC disorder, suffered by Mrs. MCR was mild even less defensible that the consent given by Ms.. MCR (not only to sign the parental agreement measures on 27 October 2008, but also jointly submit the request for approval on 26 February 2009) was flawed because the only consequence would be tolerable if disorder would have been severe to the point of annulling the decision capacity. If instead that condition was serious enough to prevent Mrs. MCR provide a free and conscious consent, as her defense, then you understand that neither was able to take care of your child's age.
Therefore, in either case the appeal can not be admitted without prejudice if the appellant proves that his psychological state has substantially changed from the time that the contested decision was issued may request a modification of the measures taken therein as a result of a given situation.
IV .- As for why the appellant came to a psychological situation in which, in his view, had been annulled its decision-making capacity, has not been proven, and in any case it is indifferent to purposes of this procedure, it was Mr. PJS who caused and what is clear is that it can be concluded that two professionals in medicine were mentioned by Mr manipulated to give a specific diagnosis and, therefore, whatever the cause psychological disorder suffered by Mrs. MCR at the time of signing the agreement and parental measures irrespective of its intensity, this existed in greater or lesser degree.
For the same reasons we can not estimate the demand that retrotreguin subsidiary of actions in the first instance so that each party to ratify the agreement signed at the time, as it should be understood that the fact submit the request for approval of that agreement together four months after he signed it equivalent to its ratification. "
Judgement of the Civil Court of the Superior Court dated 24.9.2009, rapporteur E. Amat, due 101/09.

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